Other alternatives to consolidation that lawmakers should consider are:

−   Mandating Sunset staff recommendations under Issue 1,[i] short of consolidation, followed by a follow-up Sunset review in 2011. By that time, S.B. 103 (2007) reforms[ii] will have been fully implemented and new leadership will be settled. 

−  Placing both agencies under one governing board tasked with improving coordination and collaboration.

−   Consolidating the two agencies effective 2011, contingent upon the successful development of a Juvenile Justice Improvement Plan.

(2) Require the development of a five-year Juvenile Justice Improvement Plan to facilitate effective coordination between TYC and TJPC. The development of an effective juvenile justice system that delivers adequate rehabilitative services to youth is critical to the current and long-term public safety of Texas communities. New neurological research demonstrates that the adolescent brain is still developing its capacity for rational judgment and impulse control until age 25; thus, juvenile justice interventions represent the last, best chance to redirect troubled youth toward a law-abiding future. Texas must ensure that the juvenile justice services delivered with state funds maximize this opportunity to turn young lives around.

As such, a major overhaul of the juvenile justice system requires careful planning by state and local stakeholders to best support youth success. Developing a Juvenile Justice Improvement Plan to guide that effort will provide an opportunity for local juvenile probation departments and the state to partner to determine where service gaps exist and to develop collaborative solutions to address these unmet needs. Critical elements that must be a part of the planning effort to ensure full realization of positive outcomes are below:

■   A transparent and inclusive development process that includes outside stakeholders, such   as youth, families, community and advocacy groups, and experts in the field. 

■   A major data collection initiative so that Texas lawmakers can base their deliberations on objective data about effective programs, rather than on anecdotal evidence alone. Currently, no state agency tracks local juvenile probation outcomes to determine which programs are working for youth. This lack of data is a major roadblock to Texas’ efforts to rationalize and coordinate state juvenile justice funding. This initiative should receive dedicated funding that can only be used toward this purpose, and lawmakers should require an outside entity to conduct this data collection and research. The outside entity could be either a legislative advisory entity, such as the State Auditor or the Legislative Budget Board, or a nationally recognized organization that specializes in juvenile justice policy research and has done it for other states, such as the National Council on Crime and Delinquency.[iii]

In Florida, the Office of Public Policy and Government Accountability (OPPAGA) conducted extensive research on the provision and quality of juvenile justice services. Many of the areas studied by OPPAGA are critical for Texas lawmakers to understand in order to develop the juvenile justice system that Texans deserve. Below are key research topics that should be included for study in any Juvenile Justice Improvement Plan:

−   Use of state and local post-adjudication facilities, including the kinds of treatment programs offered, staffing ratios for direct care, case management and clinical staff, and the demographics of youth (offense, treatment need, age, race, gender, education, etc.) who are placed in state facilities versus local post-adjudication facilities.

−   Outcomes of local post-adjudication facilities by facility. 

−   Use of probation revocation to commit youth to TYC custody. Approximately 50% of all youth who are committed to TYC each year arrive as a result of a probation violation.

−   Use of progressive sanctions guidelines by juvenile judges. 

−   Use of risk and needs assessments to guide disposition decisions. 

(3) Redesign state funding to encourage the use of intensive, non-residential interventions for lower-risk offenders. Texas should strive for safe communities and successful juvenile justice interventions, with only those youth who pose a danger to themselves or others incarcerated in TYC facilities. Yet, the state funding structure for juvenile justice fails to support these goals. 

Texas counties bear the brunt of costs for locally administered juvenile justice services. Conversely, once a youth is committed to TYC, the state covers all expenses for his or her care. This produces a fiscal incentive for counties to commit youth, such as non-violent property or drug offenders, who could be served in the community, if the state provided local governments with sufficient resources. 

This lopsided fiscal architecture is not unique to Texas. Other states struggling to reduce abuses in their juvenile corrections system have successfully adopted pilot funding programs to encourage counties to reduce their commitments to state juvenile correctional facilities and instead provide the needed intensive services to youth at the local level. 

■   Redeploy Illinois. Created in 2004, Redeploy Illinois is a pilot program designed to provide services to youth between the ages of 13 and 18 who are at high risk of being committed to the state juvenile corrections system. The program gives counties a fiscal incentive to provide services to youth within their home communities by building a continuum of care for youth who are in the juvenile justice system. Unfortunately, many counties in Illinois lack the resources to effectively serve delinquent youth locally, which has played a significant role in courts’ decisions to commit a youth to a correctional facility. The funds provided to the Redeploy pilot sites fill the gaps in their continuum of services, allowing them to cost-effectively serve youth in their home communities and reduce the system’s reliance on corrections. Using Redeploy funds, counties link youth to a wide array of needed services and supports within the home community, as indicated through an individualized needs assessment. Services are provided in the least restrictive manner possible, and can include case management, court advocacy, education assistance, individual/family/group counseling, and crisis intervention. Data from its first year of operation indicate that the program resulted in savings to the state of over $2.4 million, and reduced commitments to the juvenile corrections system by an average of 33%.[iv]

■   RECLAIM Ohio. Ohio’s Reasoned and Equitable Community and Local Alternatives to Incarceration of Minors (RECLAIM) is a funding initiative started in 1993 which encourages juvenile courts to develop or purchase a range of community-based options to rehabilitate youth offenders. By diverting youth from the state juvenile correctional system, juvenile courts have the opportunity to increase the funds available locally through RECLAIM. The direct connection between funding and sentencing provides the local juvenile court with an incentive to carefully consider the appropriateness of an institutional placement for non-violent youth prior to commitment. A key component of RECLAIM is coordination and communication between the local juvenile courts and the state juvenile corrections system.

Note: RECLAIM funding to local courts is based on the average number of felony offenses adjudicated by that court during a four-year period. The money comes initially in the form of “credits.” The court’s number of credits is reduced for every Department of Youth Services “bed day” used to carry out a disposition from that court during the previous year. “Public safety” beds, for youth charged with serious violent offenses (such as murder or rape) are not counted against a county’s RECLAIM allocation. (RECLAIM is a complementary funding stream to the Youth Services Grant, another more generalized type of state support for local juvenile justice systems.)[v]

(4) Support partnerships with private foundations engaged in innovative juvenile justice reform efforts.  For example, the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI), which partners with local jurisdictions to seek alternatives to pre-adjudication detention of youth who do not pose a risk to public safety. Currently, both Dallas and Harris Counties are JDAI sites. Evidence from other JDAI sites throughout the country demonstrate that successful detention reform at the local level can ultimately lead to fewer youth committed to state care.[vi]

Texas is one of four states (along with Colorado, Connecticut, and Ohio) that was selected in 2008 in a highly competitive process by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation to participate in a Juvenile Justice/Mental Health Action Network to improve mental health services for young offenders. The network is coordinated by the National Center for Mental Health and Juvenile Justice. As part of the network, TJPC and other state agencies will work to find new ways to identify and treat youth involved in the juvenile justice system who have serious mental health needs. Efforts will be carried out in local juvenile probation departments to develop model programs that can be used to create a set of best practices for others across the nation. 

These private-public partnerships with foundations committed to positive reform of the juvenile justice system should be supported and encouraged by Texas lawmakers through matching funds, when needed. 

(5) Effectively implement S.B. 103.  Significant work from numerous stakeholders went into the development of S.B. 103 in 2007, and its proper implementation is critical to restoring the trust of Texans in the state’s capacity to protect the incarcerated youth in its custody. If successful, an improved TYC will increase public safety and economic prosperity for Texas in the long term. As such, policy-makers in this 81st legislative session must sustain the vision and investment necessary to create a model juvenile corrections system. Since the problems facing TYC were structural and historical – at least a decade in the making – it is not altogether surprising that the 2007 reforms have not yet led to the new and improved TYC sought by stakeholders. A succession of three conservators in the two years following the omnibus bill’s passage has also thwarted successful implementation of the legislation’s mandates. At last, TYC has the permanent leadership it needs to move forward with S.B. 103 implementation. Lawmakers must ensure that the agency stays the course toward deliberate, transparent implementation of the intent and the letter of the law. 

(a) Hire qualified staff and improve rehabilitative programming to increase control and safety in TYC institutions. Without adequate numbers of qualified staff and improved programming for incarcerated youth, TYC institutions will continue to suffer from violent conditions and poor outcomes. Both under-staffing and lack of programming were cited by the U.S. Department of Justice as reasons for the unconstitutionally high levels of violence in TYC’s Evins Regional Juvenile Justice Center in Edinburg.[vii]

(i)  TYC should develop a long-term workforce development plan with the goal of recruiting and retaining qualified staff. In the short term, TYC should ensure that all employees are informed about the various benefits available to them, such as Homes for Heroes and the Employee Assistance Program.[viii] In the long term, TYC should strive to gradually increase the pay and qualifications for direct care staff with the goal of eventually hiring college-educated employees. Currently, juvenile corrections officers (JCOs) are only required to have a high school diploma or GED, but direct care staff with additional education are needed to best address the complex needs of youth committed to TYC. The agency should actively work with policy-makers and higher education institutions to develop incentive programs that will encourage graduates to consider a career in TYC. In doing so, TYC must look beyond the traditional corrections field to other highly relevant disciplines, such as social work and psychology. At present, TYC is taking initial steps in this direction by providing tuition reimbursement for direct care staff taking college classes, and by providing college credit for training through a partnership with Navarro Community College. These programs should be continued and expanded.

Note:  More on the importance of staff incentives is discussed in Part 3 of this guide.

(ii) TYC must have adequate numbers of clinical staff to provide needed rehabilitative services in order to best administer quality rehabilitative programming. A serious commitment to public safety requires investment in the quality of services delivered to youth incarcerated in state-run facilities. Thus, budget appropriations must reflect the real costs of having a workforce that can provide needed rehabilitative services to the state’s most troubled youth.

(b) Enhance independent oversight of TYC services and youth rights. Over the last 18 months of an often turbulent reform process, the Office of the Independent Ombudsman (OIO) has served as a critical, independent voice for youth incarcerated in TYC institutions and on parole. Despite its tiny size and limited resources, the OIO has successfully identified a number of systemic problems with delivery of services to youth in TYC (such as medical care and special education), drawn attention to severely inadequate conditions of confinement at contract care facilities, and provided assistance to hundreds of individual youth and families. The OIO plays a vital role in S.B. 103 implementation and continued reform of the system: the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention has identified the existence of ombudsman offices as an important element in protecting the rights of youth in custody, as well as protecting the state against liability.[ix] In order to guarantee that this office continues to serve the important role of protecting the state’s most troubled youth, greater resources are necessary.

(c) Strengthen TYC parole to protect public safety and give troubled youth, families, and communities a chance at success, without placing additional burdens on counties. The real measure of TYC’s effectiveness is in a youth’s behavior post-release. Untreated chemical dependency, a lack of coordination among agency systems, and an often fractured family system contribute to the likelihood that a juvenile offender will commit another crime. In order to provide meaningful oversight and support to youth exiting its institutions, TYC’s parole program requires an increased investment and focus from the Legislature. Parole must no longer be treated as an afterthought by TYC, with its effectiveness contingent upon the resources provided by counties.  The first several months following a youth’s institutional confinement is a critical one where the lessons learned in secure care can easily be undone without proper supports. The period of re-entry should be viewed as the last and most important phase of a youth’s treatment while in TYC custody. The role of parole should be to support youth in applying the lessons learned in secure confinement and to connect them with resources, while closely monitoring their progress.

TYC parole must:

−   Provide youth with more structured re-integration into their home environments, including day treatment programs, re-entry support groups, and family counseling.

−   Increase family and community involvement in parole by implementing elements of proven, non-residential programming such as Functional Family Therapy, Multisystemic Therapy, and Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care.[x] Currently, TYC is moving in this direction through the development of Functional Family Parole, a program that utilizes the evidence-based Functional Family Therapy program as its foundation.  

−   Allocate sufficient resources to the parole division so that offices have funds to send a youth to specialized aftercare services (e.g., chemical dependency, sex offender, etc.), or access to family counseling. Currently, youth are directed to county-provided services. If counties do not provide adequate medical, behavioral health, educational, or vocational resources, a youth is simply on his or her own. 

TYC also has an obligation to protect public safety in making its parole decisions. A parole risk-needs assessment instrument would assist TYC in making better choices about when youth are ready to be paroled. A well-designed parole assessment instrument would assess not only risk, but also treatment need.

(d) Move TYC over the next decade toward a regionalized system of state-operated juvenile correctional and transition facilities that are smaller (<100 beds), more therapeutic, and closer to the communities that youth come from – similar to those operated in Missouri. In spring 2007, TYC in conjunction with the University of Texas-Austin School of Social Work convened a Blue Ribbon Task Force to explore best practices for juvenile justice in Texas. In its final report, the Task Force put forth numerous recommendations,[xi] some of which focused on Texas adopting aspects of the widely-acclaimed Missouri model.

Throughout the 1960s and into the early 1970s, Missouri’s large juvenile institutions, also known as “training schools,” were struggling with very high numbers of assaults and escapes. By 1971, this violent atmosphere had left about a quarter of staff positions vacant.[xii] In 1975, Missouri adopted a five-year plan that laid the groundwork for today’s accomplishments; it called for the closing of the large training schools, the expansion of community-based services, and the establishment of five service delivery regions. The end goal for the change was the creation of a quality and seamless continuum of care,which would provide a range of services to youth in each of the five regions within 30 to 50 miles of their homes, also bringing them closer to medical and mental health care professionals, as well as their families.

In the three decades since its adoption, the “Missouri model” has been heralded as a “guiding light for reform”[xiii] in juvenile justice. Its unconventional approach – emphasizing treatment and least-restrictive care – is considered to be far more successful than the incarceration-oriented systems used in most other states.[xiv] The Missouri system has garnered bipartisan praise from across the state’s political spectrum.[xv]

Much has been made of Missouri’s surprisingly low recidivism rate of around 8%, but recidivism is measured somewhat differently in Missouri than in other states. The 8% refers only to those youth who are recommitted to the Missouri Division of Youth Services (DYS) within a year following their release and does not track youth who re-offend as adults. A recidivism report from Missouri’s DYS released in February, 2003, shows that in FY 1999:

− 8% of youth were sentenced to state prison/adult incarceration within three years;

− 19% of youth were sentenced to adult probation;

− 6% of youth were recommitted to MDYS; and

− 9% of youth were temporarily returned to residential facilities for breaking rules while in aftercare.

It is also important to note that the state of Missouri relies more heavily on certification of juvenile offenders as adults than Texas does. In FY 2003, Texas certified 61 children as adults.[xvi] In that same year, Missouri certified 120 children as adults.[xvii] Given the difference in the states’ juvenile populations (Texas’ being much larger), Missouri’s is a shockingly high number.[xviii] This suggests that Missouri’s system deals with a different population in its state juvenile corrections system than Texas does; the most serious offenders are likely to go to the adult system rather than come through Missouri’s DYS. From FY 2001-05, only about half of the new commitments to Missouri’s state juvenile system had committed a felony-level offense.

Thus, while there are striking population differences between Missouri and Texas, there are still many lessons that we can learn from Missouri’s successes. The replacement of a punitive philosophy with one centered on treatment has been integral to the success of the entire system. Moreover, the regionalization of MDYS allowed for the development of a continuum of services, ensured access to qualified treatment professionals, and facilitated inclusion of families and communities in the rehabilitation process – all of which paved the way for Missouri’s lower recidivism rates.

■    Use the Juvenile Justice Improvement Plan as a vehicle toward transformation of the Texas system, using the lessons of Missouri’s system change as a guide. 

■    Allow TYC flexibility in using 2007 bond funding. In 2007, Texas voters approved $25 million in bond funding to construct a new TYC facility of 150 beds near an urban center.[xix] In 2008, TYC requested permission from state leadership to use that bond funding to construct three 48-bed facilities located near urban areas. This request more closely reflects the goal of moving toward a regionalized system of care similar to Missouri’s. Generally speaking, bigger is not better when it comes to secure juvenile facilities. Large training schools that house 100+ youth, like TYC facilities, have been proven to be the least effective and most costly way of rehabilitating troubled youth.[xx] These facilities are expensive to run, extremely difficult to staff, and are located far from the communities that these young people come from and the services that they need.

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[i] The Sunset Advisory Commission’s staff report listed Issue 1 as, “Texas’ Juvenile Justice Agencies, Services, and Funding Need Major Restructuring to Ensure an Effective Continuum of Treatment and Sanctions for Youthful Offenders.” Issue 1 includes ten recommendations from Sunset staff. The first two focus on consolidation of TYC and TJPC into one state agency, to be called the Texas Juvenile Justice Department. The remaining eight are recommendations for systems coordination that can be implemented independently of consolidation.

[ii] Significant key reforms included in S.B. 103 (Hinojosa, D-McAllen) include enhanced community-based supervision programs as an alternative to detention; a parents’ Bill of Rights; a special prosecution system and an Office of Inspector General for the independent investigation and prosecution of crimes occurring in youth detention facilities, an independent ombudsman for youth victims, and public reporting of cases of abuse; the prevention of misdemeanants from being sent to TYC; and improved procedures governing the termination of a child’s placement in TYC and improved re-integration back into his or her home community.

[iii] The National Council on Crime and Delinquency, founded in 1907, is a nonprofit organization which promotes effective, humane, fair, and economically sound solutions to family, community and justice problems. Recently they have worked with juvenile justice reform measures in California, Florida, and numerous other states.

[iv] Illinois Department of Human Services. Redeploy Illinois. http://www.dhs.state.il.us/page.aspx?item=31991. 01/10/2009.

[v] RECLAIM Ohio and the Youth Services Grant (YSG) together make up the DYS Subsidy Grant. The funds received through RECLAIM are restricted to an array of treatment, intervention, diversion and prevention programs designed to divert youth from DYS. The amount is determined by a funding formula based on the number of felony adjudications and bed days used. YSG funds have been in existence since 1981 and are known as the “base” portion of the Subsidy Grant because, unlike the RECLAIM “variable” funds, their allocations do not vary and are allocated annually to juvenile courts based on a formula that uses county population. Much like TJPC's Community Corrections and State Aid Grants, YSG funds comprise the bulk of the money provided by the state to county-operated juvenile systems.  No Subsidy Grant funds may be used to supplant local funds.

[vi] Mendel, Richard. Pathways to Juvenile Detention Reform, Vol. 14, Beyond Detention: System Transformation Through Juvenile Detention Reform. (Baltimore: Annie E. Casey Foundation, 2007), 14.

[vii] Department of Justice Civil Rights Division. Letter to Governor Perry Re: Evins Regional Juvenile Center, Edinburg, Texas. (March 2007) Retrieved from http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/evins_findlet_3-15-07.pdf.

[viii] Homes for Heroes, first created in 2003, is a loan program that offers affordable mortgages and down payment/closing cost assistance through grants to certain public employees in acknowledgement of their contribution to the safety and welfare of Texans. The Employee Assistance Program provides confidential, professional assistance to help employees and their families in areas such as depression, marital problems, or legal troubles.

[ix] U.S. Department of Justice Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Beyond the Walls: Improving Conditions of Confinement for Youth in Custody, Washington, DC: 1998.

[x] Functional Family Therapy is an empirically grounded and highly successful family intervention for at-risk and juvenile justice involved youth. For more information, go to http://www.fftinc.com. Multi-Systemic Therapy is a research-proven and cost-effective treatment for youth with serious behavioral problems. For more information, go to http://www.mstservices.com. Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care is a cost-effective alternative to regular foster care, group or residential treatment, and incarceration for youth who have problems with chronic disruptive behavior. For more information, go to http://www.mtfc.com. In 2006, the Washington State Institute for Public Policy found that all three of these programs saved money and reduced crime. To read their report, visit http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/07-06-1201.pdf.

[xi] Texas, Blue Ribbon Task Force. Transforming Juvenile Justice in Texas: A Framework for Action. (September 2007)

[xii] Abrams, Douglas. A Very Special Place in Life: The History of Juvenile Justice in Missouri. (Missouri Juvenile Justice Association, 2003), 198.

[xiii] Mendel, Richard A. Less Cost, More Safety: Guiding Lights for Reform in Juvenile Justice. American Youth Policy Forum, 2001.

[xiv] Abrams, Douglas, 206.

[xv] Mendel, Dick. (2003). “Small is Beautiful: The Missouri Division of Youth Services.” AdvoCasey, 5, 30-31.

[xvi] Texas Youth Commission. Juveniles Certified as Adults in Major County. http://www.tyc.state.tx.us/archive/Research/juvenile_adult_92-03.html, 10/12/2008.

[xvii] Missouri Department of Social Services. Missouri 2003 Juvenile Court Statistics Report. Retrieved from http://www.dss.mo.gov/re/pdf/dysjcs/juvcy03.pdf, 10/13/2008.

[xviii] According to 2006 census data, Texas’ under 18 population is 4,173,412, as compared to Missouri’s under 18 population of 642,824.

[xix] Texas Sunset Advisory Commission., 64.

[xx] “[R]esearch suggests that simply “locking kids up” in such facilities is an ineffective and unnecessarily expensive approach to helping troubled youth and reducing juvenile crime.” Zavlek, Shelley. “Planning Community-Based Facilities for Violent Juvenile Offenders as Part of a System of Graduated Sanctions.” OJJDP Juvenile Justice Bulletin. Juvenile Justice Practices Series. August 2005.